The paper describes adjustments within the Madrid aeronautics cluster, which are driven by changes in the sourcing strategy of Airbus. Knowledge capabilities gain importance for the relations and importance of single organisations. Based on a detailed analysis of single organisations in the cluster, implications for the network structures and innovation processes are discussed.
Introduction
The dynamic of productive systems has been characterised in recent decades by the constant transformation of the organisation of production in all kinds of activities, particularly in the most innovative (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988; Porter, 1998; Gordon and McCann, 2000) . Increased competition due to globalisation and technological change has forced firms to abandon the traditional Fordist model. Industrial districts and industrial complexes have been restructured and more flexible forms of territorial organisation of production such as firm networks and clusters have developed.
The introduction of innovations and new technologies is the mechanism that brings about change in the organisation of production models, which, in turn, facilitates different mechanisms for the creation of knowledge and the diffusion of innovation within firm networks. The vertical circulation of information and knowledge led by innovative firms has become less significant as innovations are diffused. Interactive strategies are being developed and accumulated knowledge in subcontracting firms is incorporated into goods and services produced within the firm network. Knowledge flows in all directions and is incorporated into the final product (Lundvall, 1992; Hudson, 1999; Maskel, 2001; Cooke, 2002) .
This article will show that radical changes have taken place in the aeronautics industry, both in organisation of production and in the creation and diffusion of innovation and knowledge. Lester and Piore (2004) point out that increased competition and the creativity of firms and people are the main forces driving these changes. To discover the inner workings of the process, the Madrid aeronautical cluster is analysed based on the results of a survey made in the cluster firms as well as private and public service firms and institutions. 1 After explaining the relationships between networking, the learning process and innovation, the article will apply these observations to the aeronautics industry and, in particular, to the cluster in Madrid. Next, the relations among cluster firms, the mechanisms through which innovation and knowledge are transmitted and how learning processes affect local innovation systems are discussed. Lastly, the reader will find some general considerations as to the factors behind the new model of organisation of production, the process of creation and diffusion of innovation and firm relations within the network.
Knowledge, learning and networking
Over the last two decades, a process of integration of the productive system and markets has steadily acquired global dimensions, which has led to increased competition and, consequently, adjustments in productive systems. Since firms do not compete alone, but rather within the context of their productive and institutional milieu, globalisation has fostered new modes of spatial organisation of production. In this increasingly competitive world, continuous improvements and innovations in processes, products and organisation have been introduced and different kinds of relationships between innovation and new forms of spatial organisation of production have appeared (Vazquez-Barquero, 2002 , 2005 .
When Marshall deals with industrial districts, he refers to the importance of knowledge shared among firms in a district as 'industrial atmosphere'. Perroux (1955) on the other hand, interprets industrial complexes through the notion of growth poles and argues that productive activity is led by innovative firms, located in a productive pole and capable of spreading innovation and knowledge throughout the network of auxiliary firms that settle around it. Porter (1998) states that clusters play a vital role in the ability of companies to innovate and in the diffusion of knowledge. Interaction with other firms promotes learning and knowledge, while the pressure of competition and constant comparison with other firms stimulates capacities and advantages for innovation within the cluster.
These factors lead to an association of clusters with the knowledge economy (Cooke, 2002; Maskel, 2001) . Clusters exist because of advantages of knowledge generated by firms working in an innovative atmosphere. Once a firm is successful in the market with a new product resulting from new knowledge, a group of imitators interested in producing the same product materialises. This creates a cluster, which then attracts newcomers, who in turn strengthen the cluster even more and expand its knowledge base (Tallman et al., 2004) . Hudson (1999) points out that there is growing recognition that knowledge is the most strategic resource in the present form of organisation of production. Since knowledge is created and transformed through learning, it is learning that has become the most important process. Lawson and Lorenz (1999, p.307) state that the process of generating knowledge is based on three basic ideas: first, knowledge, which is mostly tacit, is embodied in organisational routines and procedures of firms; second, the production of new knowledge within organisations depends on the combination of diverse knowledge and finally, firms usually find it difficult to make effective use of new knowledge because they tend to resist change in organisational routines and procedures.
Thus, learning is 'path dependent' in the sense that the creation of knowledge presupposes the existence of acquired knowledge. Yet, learning is to a large extent interactive (Lundvall, 1992) , which is why interacting firms need to share a language and culture. As Camagni (1991) points out, learning is not merely the acquisition of information, but rather a process through which information is transformed into knowledge. Firms need to develop a 'decoding function' that will allow them to incorporate outside information. Therefore, in order for the learning process to take place, firms must have a collective language. In other words, learning and language share the same codes.
Although, as Hudson (1999) maintains, the national context of innovation and learning plays an important role, local learning and knowledge systems are, perhaps, more significant (Maskel et al., 1998) . Gilly and Torre (2000) point out that physical and organisational proximity facilitates the exchange of goods, services, resources and information among firms and other actors in a locality and stimulates interaction and the creation and diffusion of tacit knowledge. Furthermore, firms and actors must share a set of rules that facilitate cooperation and diffusion of innovations and knowledge through a collective learning process.
The notion of local environment ('milieu'), acknowledges that the territory plays a strategic role in the creation and diffusion of ideas and innovations (Crevoisier et al., 1990; Perrin, 1990) . As Maillat (1995) explains, innovations and technological change arise in a specific territory and are associated with local know-how, the qualification of human resources and knowledge institutions involved in research and development. The creation and diffusion of innovations is based on interaction of firms within the milieu. The performance of firms, the economy and society, the innovative capacity of firms, the creative and productive culture of the milieu and the economic and technological history of the location, are all factors that condition learning processes. These factors constitute the response of firms to the challenge of competition.
In an ever more competitive and globalised world, learning and the creation of knowledge are essential to produce quality goods and services and maintain a competitive position within the market. Geographical and institutional proximity favours interaction and diffusion of knowledge, reduces transaction costs and helps firms improve their profitability. Thus, the term learning region is used when speaking of more dynamic economies leading processes of structural change on a global level (Florida, 1995; Maskel et al., 1998) .
Aeronautics and the Madrid cluster
Aeronautical activity has been a unique case since its beginnings in the first third of the 20th century since it was developed within the framework of the strategic defense needs of nations. The aeronautical industry therefore shares the characteristics of a public good as concerns the legal format within which most of the leading firms in the sector have operated, whether closer to private ownership or public property. Since the 1980s, the sector's industrial organisation has abandoned its traditional model, an unwieldy in house manufacturing organisation, to become a network of clusters located in various countries. The aeronautical cluster in Madrid is a good example of the new organisational model (Alfonso-Gil, 2006) .
Organisation of the aeronautical sector
The application of avionics to flight, understood as the challenge to the Law of Gravity, was initially in the hands of entrepreneurs for whom everything was 'home-made'. The incipient industry was essentially based on craftsmanship where the inventiveness of creators was accompanied by relative intensity in the use of labour due to the level of knowledge at the time and, particularly, the difficulty of automating production. The automobile industry had initially found itself in the same situation. In fact, although the aeronautical industry now shows a high level of applied knowledge in production processes, it still tends to use the labour factor, usually qualified labour, with relative intensity.
In-house manufacturing in the various productive stages has changed substantially. The Coasian concept of enterprise is fully represented in the aeronautical industry. It is evident that original equipment manufactures (OEMs) increasingly depend on the market (external suppliers) for most of their manufactured parts as opposed to in-house production. Moreover, the aviation industry is an example of collaboration of a broad network of interconnected firms, particularly the OEMs connected to suppliers through contracts including all aspects in the building of an aircraft. From screws to motors, sophisticated air conditioning systems, pressurising and electronic systems or supply of new materials -everything is manufactured by contracted suppliers outside the OEMs. Of course, there are hierarchies among suppliers depending on the amount of participation in the project. In fact, one of the keys to understanding modern industrial organisation in the aeronautical sector is decoding the salient points in relations among firms and analysing the power hierarchy within the aeronautical complex.
As opposed to the trajectory followed up to the 1980s, the role of the market of aeronautical firm networks is evident in two recent tendencies. First, given the volume of resources necessary for the launching of a new plane, many manufacturers of important components and, particularly, suppliers of integrated systems are playing a much more active role in the adventure of building and marketing a plane. Financial participation in the success or failure of the common project (whether desired or not) has led key suppliers to share in the financial risk involved in the project. They have begun, in fact, to behave like active partners who, as such, share in the results of the business. Secondly, production in modern aviation is increasingly international. The overflowing of national borders is a fact and the days in which the aeronautical industry was seen as a national endeavor are long past. In the industrial organisation of Airbus, the main aircraft components are made in various countries before they are finally assembled.
The Madrid aeronautical cluster
The aeronautical cluster of Madrid is a geographical concentration of very diverse firms, inter-related and specialised in the production of specific parts of the products marketed by the two large oligopolies of the aeronautical industry, particularly EADS, as well as auxiliary firms, and firms and organisations that supply services to the cluster.
At the core of the aeronautical cluster of Madrid is the EADS consortium, through two of its firms EADS-CASA and Airbus España. Since its attachment to EADS in 1999, CASA (the pioneering aeronautical firm in Spain: Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A.) has had to adapt to EADSs organisation into divisions. EADS-CASA has specialised in activities related to military transport planes. It is, in fact, the Military Transport Planes Division of EADS. Activities related to the Airbus program have been transferred to the corresponding EADS division of Airbus, Airbus-España, S.L., entirely controlled by Airbus Industrie SAS, with headquarters in Toulouse (France). Airbus Industrie is responsible for the design, development and manufacture of structural components for all models of Airbus planes. With a clear competitive advantage over other production units of Airbus in Europe, Airbus-España specialised initially in horizontal stabilisers for the Airbus family of planes and the manufacturing of composite materials (epoxy carbon fibre, Kevlar).
A group of firms has grown up around this central nucleus. They are closely related to the EADS group, but also work with Boeing and other firms and organisations of other aeronautical, aerospace and industrial activities. This is the case of Indra, GAMESA, SENER and TECNOBIT, all of which were studied in the sample. Indra, with 6,400 employees, is the best and most international Spanish firm in informatics and electronic equipment for the defence market (avionics and defence platforms). It manufactures simulation products and automatic systems for maintenance. GAMESA Aeronautica, with a work force of 1,774, forms part of a group that originally manufactured weapons, but today produces and supplies products, installations and advanced services in the aeronautics and renewable energies sector. Their main products are wings, fuselage and pylon for engines and interiors. TECNOBIT, with 300 employees, has specialised in defence electronics and information technology and 78% of its sales are to the aerospace sector (63% military) while exports represent more than 66% of sales. Finally, SENER, a group of firms with 950 workers, mainly works in the fields of engineering, aerospace industry and the environment. The division involved in aeronautics and aerospace produces, among other things, mechanisms and structures for air navigation, orientation systems, rocket and satellite launching systems, airport systems and engines.
There is another group of firms in the aeronautical cluster of Madrid specialised in the manufacture of goods and services for the aeronautical industry. The following have been studied: CESA, TEGRAF, GAZC and Aerlyper. CESA (217 workers) is a subsidiary company of CASA, specialised in the development of new systems and equipment for the new aircraft models, specifically the Airbus family. Fifty-two percent of CESA's present volume of sales is from civil aeronautical activity while 48% is from military aeronautics. It carries out specific tasks such as the supply of landing ramps, tanks and hydro-mechanical accessories for the Airbus program. The main activity of TEGRAF (250 employees), an affiliate of the Técnicas Aeronauticas Madrid (TAM) group, is aeronautical engineering, the assembly of aeronautics-specific tools and the integration of aeronautical subsets. Grupo Aeronautico Zona Centro (GAZC) is a group of firms created in 1999 with about 100 employees that supply services within the aeronautical sector (single piece mechanisms, final assembly of parts sets and quality control) and its main customer is EADS-CASA. Aerlyper is a family firm of 50 employees originating in agricultural aviation in 1961. Four years later it began selling small planes and offering complete maintenance of engines, propellers, electrical accessories, radios and flight instruments. Today it designs and integrates planes and optronics systems and manufactures aircraft parts which facilitate the installation of communications equipment, screening and warfare self-defence systems.
Many firms in this sector manufacture products and supply services for other industrial sectors and some of them (TAM, APRIM and RAMEM, who previously produced for the automobile sector) were born from industries undergoing restructuring processes. TAM, with a work force of about 400, emerged in 1991 from the restructuring of a firm that produced spare parts for the auxiliary automobile industry. APRIM is a family firm of 46 employees established in the 60's to supply the auto-mechanics and transport sectors. Today it has extended its clientele to include electronics, medical equipment, aeronautics and defence firms.
RAMEM, a small family firm with a staff of 13, was born in the late 50's and has evolved in its specialisation and manufacturing process. RAMEM originally manufactured machinery tools for the automobile industry. It entered the aeronautical sector in the early 70's when some auxiliary firms of the auto-mechanics sector began maintenance work for aviation companies such as Iberia. This new activity led RAMEM to establish ongoing relations with CASA particularly for the Eurofighter 2000.
A group of firms including Industria Carmona and Quality Metal form the auxiliary sector of the aeronautical industry. Industria Carmona, a family firm of 17 employees is a metal and mechanical workshop for Airbus, supplying large scale supports for moulds in the manufacture of airplane parts. Quality Metal, an affiliate of the Tam group with 17 qualified workers, was established in the 90's. Over 80% of its production is given over to aeronautical activity (25% to civil aviation and 55% to military) and the firm manufactures airplane parts for the Airbus program.
Firms that manufacture products and offer services in Madrid are widely varied, as we have just seen. In some cases they have a long tradition in the production of highly technical goods and services in national and international markets of aeronautical products. In other cases, they are new firms that have started up as a result of opportunities in the aeronautical market. They may be spin offs from previously existing firms or the result of new ventures. Still others are industrial firms with a long manufacturing tradition that now participate in aeronautical activity by incorporating knowledge acquired throughout their history (Alfonso-Gil, 2006).
Networking within the Madrid cluster
Relations among the firms and actors of the network are the key to the performance of the aeronautical cluster of Madrid, since they determine the economic, technological and power flows that underlie the cluster's dynamic.
Relations among these firms vary greatly. In some cases they are formal and explicit and are guided by decisions of the firms and actors to seek clear objectives. This is the case in the commercial exchange of goods and services, commercial relations between suppliers and clients and technical relations among firms. However, informal relations based on personal contacts between firms and actors are also significant. This often means relations among engineers, ex-employees and personnel that have worked in the sector many years. The importance of relations among engineers and executives in aeronautics firms and those in public administrations and organisms is self-evident since, for decades, aeronautical activity was linked to the public sector. Strong ties have been created that affect the economic and technological relations facilitating exchange within the network. Also, commercial relations established between firms in the cluster and the suppliers and clients from other clusters and activities are clearly essential to the functioning of the aeronautical productive system in Madrid.
Change in the organisational model of aeronautical production involving outsourcing parts of the production phases and developing subcontracting at different levels has brought about important changes in firms in the aeronautical sector. It is not uncommon that there are two or three firms in the contractual chain between the final manufacturer of the A380 and the firm that produces and supplies the parts. Outsourcing and subcontracting have brought about an increase in commercial transactions between suppliers and clients and a change in competition among firms in the cluster. Despite some drawbacks, these strategies have also made the production system more efficient and flexible, although more time is needed to effectively evaluate their impact.
EADS-CASA is a good example of change in the organisation of production, since it continues to develop design, production, termination and assembly functions while recently adopting new forms of subcontracting and outsourcing. Today, some aspects of design and other tasks previously produced in-house are now subcontracted. It is estimated that about 28% of production is outsourced or subcontracted. Simultaneous with the increase in subcontracting, EADS-CASA increasingly acts as a subcontractor, supplying aero-structures, wings, tails and tanks. Approximately 40% of EADS-CASA's production is manufactured for other firms, half of that as a risk partner in Airbus and the rest for international aeronautical manufacturers like Boeing who order from CASA the design and manufacture of components for their planes.
It is very difficult to define a priori the general rules of collaboration between one firm and another, particularly when the contract is stipulated jointly by both suppliers and buyers. Indra, for example, participates with the client in the process of defining the product or service to be developed in order to better meet its needs. The specifications of the product or service are determined between the supplier and the buyer, and, once they are defined, Indra takes charge of the design, development and manufacture of the product. To do so, it subcontracts some parts of the process or the product to one of the firms within its subcontracting network.
Subcontracting can be carried out in different ways and content will depend on the type of product or service under contract. Thus, the TAM group specifies the forms most commonly used:
• realisation of complete packages: from the conceptual design to the final product certified and delivered • establishment of mixed teams (firm-client) in charge of elaborating complete packages • mobility of human resources to client premises for engineering, trials, assembly, metrology and manufacture • logistic support for the product from the design phase to the final product.
• partial subcontracting of design activities, manufacture, assembly or verification of mechanical components.
Subcontracting is widespread among firms in the sector, but is conditioned by the size and capability of each firm. GAMESA, for example, distributes about 60% of its production to other firms located in the Basque country, Madrid Andalusia and also in southern France. CESA, on the other hand, subcontracted other firms between 2002 and 2003 for a total of seven million euros, which represents approximately 50% of its production. This type of relation is usually established with firms located within the local (the municipality, metropolitan area and region of Madrid) or national areas, though there are also examples of firms working at the EU (4%) and international (1%) levels. RAMEM, a small firm, subcontracts about 30% of its production to firms within the municipality where it is located and the Madrid metropolitan area. APRIM subcontracts 20% of its production to firms within their territory, particularly in the autonomous community of Madrid. Other firms like TECNOBIT do very little subcontracting. Client firms usually indicate the characteristics that the products on order should have and the processes to be used and they supply raw materials. Support is sometimes provided to production engineering and quality control technology and technology transfer even takes place. The firm selects and chooses its suppliers carefully to assure that they will be capable of meeting the technical and commercial requirements of first tier buyers. For the purpose of maintaining quality and control of production, suppliers must demonstrate their capacity through both general and specific certifications. Both parts carry out product quality control.
Subcontractors and suppliers compete intensely to obtain contracts for the manufacture of specific products. Thus, competition among firms that manufacture final products has shifted to subcontracted firms supplying product parts. Nevertheless, cooperation among competing firms is not uncommon, particularly when there is a large work load or one of the subcontracted firms needs the help of another member of the network to get the job done.
Internationalisation of production activity is an important characteristic of the aeronautical cluster of Madrid. Both civil and military aircraft production has become international, as concerns manufacturing and technology transfer. EADS is an international consortium that manufactures its products, components and structures in various territories where their network of suppliers is located. EADS' sales policy and clients have an international profile. The construction program for the A380 plans for the allotment of work to their network of local suppliers, but also on the list are suppliers from other countries like Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Australia.
At the same time, EADS' suppliers and subcontractors are connected to other international networks. Indra, for example, operates in over 40 countries on five continents, approximately one third of its annual income coming from international markets. Indra's main clients are in Europe and the US and they own subsidiary firms in the US, China, Portugal and Brazil. Spanish subsidiaries of US, German and Norwegian firms are among the clients of Industrias Carmona and their suppliers are often foreign firms. For example, the sheet metal used in their manufacturing processes comes from Indonesia and Bulgaria and the firm's machinery is manufactured in Europe. TAM is under contract to Airbus GMBH (Germany), Eurocomposites AG (Luxemburg), Brojte (Germany), Fisher FCC (Austria) and Fokker Stork (Holland). TECNOBIT has substantial international clients like Kaiser Electronics and Lockheed Martin from the US, BAE Systems from the UK, EADS from Spain and Rafael from Israel.
Understanding power relations within the Madrid cluster is essential to comprehending the inner workings of the network. Contrary to what might seem logical, even though pressure exerted by the large oligopolies is significant, the entrepreneurial fabric tends to promote product diversification and market strategies for the purpose of limiting the oligopolies' influence. Of course there are firms, such as GAZC, that work mostly for a strong client, in this case EADS-CASA, manufacturing parts, metal structures and aeronautical tools and even distributing products and services and managing its subcontractor network in the central area of Spain. But, firms like Aerlyper have a widely diversified portfolio and do not subcontract. Among their clients we find all the official organisms for plane and helicopter operators, including the Armed Forces, operators of private fleets of planes and helicopters, centres for aeronautical maintenance and flight clubs. They have a portfolio of over 2,000 clients and multinational equipment manufacturers are among their suppliers, particularly US and European companies like Bendix King Avionics (Honeywell), Garmin International, UPSS Aviation, Rockwell Collins, Sandel, BF Goodrich, Becker, US Gauge and the French group Martec (Serpe-Iesm).
Large firms that work for the oligopolies of civil and military aviation also maintain a widely diversified portfolio. Most of Indra's clients, for example, are institutions ranging from the Navigation Authority of Norway or Uruguay to the European Space Agency and the Spanish Ministry of Defence or Sogecable. Similarly, among SENER's clients for aeronautical products are the Spanish Ministry of Defence, the European Space Agency, Arianespace, Boeing, Saab-Ericcson, the Canadian Space Agency and Alcatel.
Diversification of production and markets is a strategy of both large and small firms. TECNOBIT (300 employees) also has a widely diversified portfolio of clients and products: planning systems, management, control and evaluation of flight operations for the Spanish Air Navigation Agency (AENA), services for the writing and elaboration of technical aeronautical documents for AENA, Telefonica (telephone company) and Spanish railway (RENFE), terminals for maritime patrol planes for the Spanish Air Force and improvement and maintenance of management systems for Caja Madrid (a savings bank). The main clients of Quality Metal (17 employees) in the aeronautical sector are CASA, for the production of specific mechanical tools and precision tables for vacuums in the factory division of planes, GAMESA Aeronautica, for whom they have designed, developed and manufactured tools, and Industria de Turbo Propulsores (ITP) for whom they have made engine parts for the Eurofighter. But Quality Metal also supplies national clients in the transportation sector such as Talgo and RENFE train companies and Tecnatom in the nuclear sector.
In any case, the relations between firms and actors in the aeronautical cluster of Madrid are clearly asymmetric due to the market power of EADS. The consolidation of relations is based on agreements, contracts and alliances that allow firms to obtain scale economies in production and research and development of products and processes, while reducing production costs. This kind of relations also benefits subcontracting firms, thus strengthening the territorial cluster. The appeal of the Madrid region has much to do with the availability of skilled human resources, the presence of firms and organisations that accumulate knowledge and know-how and the existence of a manufacturing productive fabric that has taken shape over decades.
Finally, technical relations or the exchange of coded information on products, processes, materials and organisation of the sector, acquire strategic value in aeronautical activities. These relations usually depend on contacts and personal and professional ties. Access to technical information, interactive learning and the diffusion of innovations and knowledge throughout firms in the aeronautical network in Madrid create close ties that strengthen and give cohesion to the network of actors.
Creativity and the diffusion of innovation
Aeronautical and aerospace activities have embedded important technological innovations into their products, processes and organisational models in recent decades. New forms of organisation of production have conditioned innovation processes as shown by the case studies. The aeronautical industry differs from other high tech activities in that radical innovations applied to products and processes are unusual while incremental innovations are the norm. There is no doubt that the rather spectacular results of the sector today would not have come about without constant upgrading of human resources and financial support.
The aeronautical industry is clearly a high technology activity, not only as seen in the final products sold in the market, but also in the firms' business models and their constant search for product quality. When EADS has an idea for a new commercial or military plane or helicopter or any other product, the Centre for Research and Development of the consortium is in charge of designing the basic characteristics of the prototype. Once approved and tested, the prototype is built and the production of the various parts of the plane is assigned to the productive units of the consortium that have the most competitive advantages for producing each component. Next they contract and subcontract specialised firms to do each and every task and make all components and structures. Given the organisation of aeronautical production, once the prototype is made, a continuous improvement process takes place during manufacturing, during which engineers and highly skilled workers involved in the firm network (concurring engineering) may introduce changes. Thus, the new product undergoes constant improvement.
The complexity of aeronautical and aerospace products offers firms the opportunity to adopt business models based on technological innovation. This is the case of Indra, who has become a leading firm in the Spanish information technology and defence systems markets mainly due to the creation of products with built-in solutions to problems posed by clients. Thus aeronautical and aerospace engineering firms offer the client solutions from the first step of conceptual design to the final production of goods and services, which affects the entire value chain of production. SENER, for example, has developed the following innovations:
• design and development of the electronic control unit for APME satellite antennas, which facilitates the duplication of the transmission capacity of the Hispasat system • European project for reducing noise in aeronautical motors
• design, development and production of the aviation engine EJ-200 for the Eurofighter/Typhoon • design, development and supply of landing equipment for the X-38/CRV, a crew rescue and return vehicle for the international space station • development of cybernetics in real time for managing calculations in the control centre for the new European system Egnos/Gnss-1 of satellite navigation.
High technology levels are maintained through the constant injection of knowledge and through uninterrupted quality control in the manufacturing of products, components and structures. By applying quality controls agreed upon within the sector by authorities and clients, firms improve their competitive position and receive certification as official purveyor (seal of approval) awarded by major clients. In the case of TECNOBIT, for example, this seal of approval was awarded by its major clients: Kaiser Electronics and Lockheed Martin in the US, BAE Systems in the UK, EADS-CASA and Izar of Spain and Rafael of Israel. These certifications are recognition that the firm has the knowledge, skill and equipment needed to produce the product or service. This serves as an international accreditation, which allows firms to compete within the market. Large firms like EADS-CASA, Airbus or even the Spanish Ministry of Defence require suppliers/purveyors and subcontractors of services, components and structures to be in possession of the necessary certifications in order to work for them.
The fact that the organisation of production in the aeronautical sector determines both the firms' and the cluster's innovation process can be seen when analysing the amount of knowledge required for the production of a plane. EADS feeds on internal knowledge produced by its own highly qualified human resources, which places them on the cutting edge of world technology. It also benefits from first-rate external knowledge coming from a rather small number of firms normally independent of firm headquarters. These 'tractor' firms have special relations with EADS, which includes taking on risk in the manufacture of their products and sharing knowledge strategies. Besides these horizontal flows of knowledge, EADS projects vertical flows of knowledge towards firms located at lower technological levels. There are gradients in the levels of knowledge. Thus tractor firms with a relatively high level of knowledge are able to subcontract part of their production to third parties while auxiliary and support firms that have specialised in simpler, less innovative tasks have very limited capacity for independence from EADS or the tractor firms.
These small, often family-run firms are the most numerous. They normally work with blueprints given them by EADS or tractor firms and their activity has a low level of knowledge. In recent years, some of them have evolved from being mere receptors of blueprints to participating in the design of the parts commissioned in the subcontract. It is a qualitative change and an example to be followed by other small and medium size firms within the sector.
It is, as stated above, the organisational model of each firm that conditions the internal process of innovation. CESA is a good example of this. Once the executive committee accepts the proposal for the manufacture of a new product from the technical and commercial departments, the area of new products development or the research and product development (R+D) centre develop the knowledge needed for the task. Once the product is developed and assessed, information and knowledge are transferred to the operations department, where knowledge relating to processes and development of new techniques (process innovations) is produced. Next, the knowledge package goes to the manufacturing and sales departments.
Along the way, both large and small aeronautics firms in the Madrid cluster create and develop product and process innovations. More examples can be found in the reports on TAM, SENER, APRIM and GAMESA. Furthermore, innovations affect the use of new materials and even market innovations, as the GAMESA report points out.
Most innovations created and introduced into the cluster firms are incremental. When aeronautical firms face the challenge of creating a new airplane and manufacturers require new specifications, the processes of innovation and embedding knowledge into products, processes and materials receives a boost, which often involves adaptations and development of pre-existing knowledge. The adoption of innovations associated with new information and communication technologies is transformed into changes in management and in the organisation of firms.
The adoption and adaptation of technology from other activities comes about naturally in the aeronautical and aerospace industry because the productive system is an open cluster in which firms are also linked to other clusters and productive systems. As mentioned above, some firms in the cluster emerged from other manufacturing activities, such as the automobile sector, while others also do work for other sectors, although often closely related to aeronautics. The adaptation of technologies from other sectors is almost a process of craftsmanship since the aeronautical and aerospace industries are highly mechanised but hardly standardised.
Incremental technological improvements come about through the transmission of formal and tacit knowledge. Not only is blueprint and design information transmitted through technical product specifications, but knowledge accumulated through the learning of individuals and firms facilitates the interpretation of formal knowledge and the application of knowledge. Thus, in small firms like Industrias Carmona, with little capability for creating their own formal or scientific knowledge, a flow of tacit knowledge takes place within the firm and with the rest of the firms in the sector. Similarly, GAZC has accumulated knowledge and know-how over the years, which facilitate the production of parts according to client needs. This acquired capacity gives the firm a competitive advantage with respect to other firms in the sector.
Firms in the aeronautics cluster are only able to respond to the challenges of producing frontier technology goods if they have the necessary skilled human resources and investments in R+D. In innovative firms like Indra human resources are the main competitive advantage. The capacity to innovate and add value to products can only come from a highly qualified team. According to Indra 'it is the people that research, learn, teach and ultimately, create the product and process innovations'. For all these reasons, management of human resources is one of the target areas for Indra, their objectives being to create an atmosphere that emphasises quality and innovation and to establish a management model for human resources that guarantees flexibility, capability and personal development for all workers. Thus, during 2003, training activities increased significantly, both in class hours as well as in total investment, while training itineraries were also used as a tool for planning individualised training and giving priority to specific training areas. In sum, one of the pillars on which the philosophy of the aeronautical and aerospace firms of the Madrid cluster rests is to encourage a culture of innovation.
Upgrading worker skills is particularly developed in the more dynamic firms. In less innovative firms, however, the 'human resource' factor is also strategic because it allows them to accumulate a stock of tacit knowledge as a result of work done for the more innovative firms in the cluster. While availability of skilled and trained workers with higher education is increasingly essential in this process, the presence of technicians and qualified workers that have learned on-the-job and worked on diverse tasks in various departments within the firm is also important. Some auxiliary firms like Industrias Carmona face the problem that some specialists and workers trained in specific trades, like boilermaker, have become difficult to find making vocational training for specialised jobs, such as welder, boilermaker, driller and lathe operator, an absolute must in order to fill job openings in these activities.
The more dynamic and innovative firms require units specialised in the creation and adaptation of technologies and knowledge in order to make product and process innovations. For the aeronautics industry, technology for the conception and development of products is crucial and the more dynamic firms carefully emphasise R+D. But firms that carry out less complicated tasks within the aeronautical firm network are also aware of the importance of investment in innovation.
The amount of financial resources invested in R&D varies. The more innovative and dynamic firms heavily endow innovation and development efforts. Indra sets aside 7% of the total budget for this objective and SENER 12% of their turnover while TECHNOBIT spent almost four million euros in 2003 or 21% of its turnover and close to 18% of total expenses on R&D investments. The smaller, less dynamic firms who base their competitive strategy on acquired knowledge, experience over time and keeping their industrial secrets within the firm also spend part of their resources on innovation. This is the case of Aerlyper and APRIM who spend 2% of total costs on investment in R+D.
Learning and the Madrid system of innovation
Cluster firms share a constant search for new applications to transform the product, adapt it to changes in demand and produce more efficiently. Innovation processes in the aeronautical cluster of Madrid are essentially systemic, as shown by the refuelling in flight mechanism for planes. EADS created the concept and the product, the execution of the work was given to CESA in a public tender and CESA, in turn, subcontracted the work to a group of small firms, including RAMEM. The innovation process takes place through the participation of all the firms in the network, each according to its capabilities, within the aeronautical industry's value chain. The process is, therefore, the result of technological strategies of firms that compete in each segment of the value chain of the aeronautical production.
Each firm specialises in a task in the production of the final product, and exchanges the goods and services it produces or requires within the aeronautical productive system network. Knowledge exchange increases the flow of tacit knowledge embedded within the firms, reduces innovation development costs and the time needed for production and application of new techniques and technologies, and stimulates the diffusion of knowledge among network firms through commercial transactions and the circulation of ideas and concepts.
As Arrow (1962) pointed out, learning during the production process leads to an increase in industrial productivity. This effect is much more significant when the organisation of production is flexible and integrates a large number of firms and workers, as in the case of the aeronautical and aerospace cluster. The flow of accumulated tacit knowledge within the network impregnates the entire productive fabric and each of the firms. Moreover, the learning process of the firms within the aeronautical sector acquires a collective dimension in that they are located in an environment where economic, social and institutional agents and actors are present. This collective factor of learning increases as firms interact with the actors of this environment.
Indra, for example, affirms having a fluid relationship with universities in the region and with other public research organisations by way of their mutual participation in various R&D programs, such as the Profit Program and the European Union framework program for R&D&i. SENER participates in R+D projects with the Polytechnic University of Madrid and CESA collaborates with research centres like INTA and the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC), the School of Aeronautical Engineering at the Polytechnic University of Madrid and the Chemistry Faculty at the Complutense University of Madrid. They therefore have access to basic research results and carry out the applied research independently, an activity facilitated by its participation in the Profit Program and the Entrepreneurial Innovation Plan of the Madrid Institute of Economic Development (IMADE). GAMESA acknowledges cooperating with public and semi-public industries for the development of products and processes.
However, smaller firms, like Aerlyper and Industrias Carmona, claim to have little relation with public research centres, universities and public administrations probably due to the fact that they participate in innovation processes through the application of knowledge acquired through incremental innovations in the production of components. The question is not one of firm size, however, but rather of quantity and type of the work done in the production of planes and aerospace products. RAMEM, for example, with 13 workers, has a strong network for cooperation in the development of product innovation with institutions like the CSIC, the departments of Physics (Condensed Materials) and Applied Chemistry at the Autonomous University of Madrid and the Institute of Microelectronics of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. It also participates in national programs like Profit and regional programs like Pie.
The creative capacity of low intensity innovation firms is focused on introducing small changes and improvements in response to pressure to innovate by the market competition. They attempt to reduce production costs, satisfy client demands and maintain their market quota within the subcontracting network. Because of this, they value tacit knowledge, which facilitates incremental innovations, particularly in the area of production processes. Also, in response to client demands, these firms must conclude their commitments in a short period of time and often finance their operations since clients do not always face payment as diligently as required.
Thus, knowledge is diffused throughout the network and affects all stages in the manufacture of an airplane or aerospace product. But the firms do not always seek to patent or otherwise formally protect their innovations. In general, large firms tend to patent their innovations as is the case of Airbus España with 13 patents developed in the last five years or GAMESA, with 12 patents. However, firms do not appear to be under great pressure to register patents, as noted in the case of CESA, who has not patented its most recent innovations and, most notably, the in-flight refuelling mechanism made for EADS. This can be explained by the fact that once a firm produces a component for final aircraft assembly, it 'has the right' to continue producing the component for the lifetime of the model it was designed for thus allowing the firm to protect its industrial secret and avoid patenting.
The majority of small and medium size firms (such as TECHNOBIT or Industrias Carmona) whose innovations are incremental do not usually register patents, either due to the actual dynamic of subcontracting that restricts changes in products or because they are confident they own the industrial property making it unnecessary to patent. Nevertheless, some of the small firms do acknowledge the convenience of patenting. Due to RAMEM's participation in the Entrepreneurial Innovation Program of the Region of Madrid, its R+D activity has increased, leading the firm to take risks, patent its new products and put them on the market.
Networking and innovation in aeronautics
This paper has discussed the new model of organisation of production, the creation and diffusion of innovation and knowledge, and the interaction of firms within the aeronautical cluster. It is now time to summarise the main points of the discussion by addressing the most important questions that have arisen during the discussion.
First, why have these changes in the organisation of production in the aeronautics industry come about? One interpretation is that they represent an entrepreneurial response to increased competitive pressure brought on by economic integration, technological change and deregulation (Lester and Piore, 2004) . On the one hand, the firm (in this case, Airbus) focuses on improving productivity of its main activity. On the other hand, the restructured firm must approach the market to obtain factors and products that it formerly produced 'in-house'. This restructuring of production brought new firms into being, many emerging from former public enterprises often constituted ex novo by the personnel of expiring state firms. These restructured firms had technological levels similar to those of the former public firm but with much lower production costs. Others emerged as spin offs from former public firms, which controlled a majority of the capital but chose to externalise those high tech activities not central to the firm's main activity. The resulting spin offs were not only a lucrative source of profit for the OEM as a shareholder, but also had greater access to clients as a 'nominally' independent firm. The process brought about the creation of more firms and more market in the aeronautical sector.
Another factor is the breakdown of the 'in-house' productive model in which firms disregarded market conditions to manufacture aircraft components with the resulting high production costs. This breakdown led to outsourcing and the emergence of a group of subcontracting firms at various levels of the productive process. The disintegration of the in-house model led the productive fabric (i.e., the market) to assign tasks to firms according to their technological capabilities and knowledge thus creating high tech networks laid out in clusters. Networking production costs were reduced with advances in information technologies and new techniques of flexible manufacturing.
This solution to high production costs, however, had an undesired result, that is, higher transaction costs between the OEMs (such as Airbus) and subcontracting firms. High transaction costs are endemic to the sector only because of the proliferation of subcontracting firms. Not only is the sector subject to the complexity of contractual relations between firms, but also to the complex manufacturing protocol and quality certifications required of all aeronautical parts suppliers.
How do technological change and innovation come about in the aeronautics sector? Aeronautics is a high tech activity and does not, therefore, necessarily depend on the market. As long as it receives political and financial support for both productive processes and purchase of the product, the industry could disregard market dictates as occurred in the countries where aviation was developed. Market concerns were practically non-existent in the great decisions of the industry during the entire 20th century.
High technology does not necessarily imply that the sector or the leading firms has carried out research tasks. The building of aircraft is a matter of putting basic and applied knowledge to work. Therefore the major contribution of the industry has involved innovation in the area of design, industrial development and 'learning by doing'. The creation and diffusion of innovation have been associated with specific resources and knowledge institutions in the territory (Maillat, 1995) . Significant innovative applications were generated and adapted during the construction of a new product or processes, but there was essentially little or no formal research. Creativity of firms and people has been strategic for innovation in aeronautics.
Innovation represents the most dynamic profile of the aviation industry where total innovation is more than the sum of specific innovations in all the participating firms. In turn, these firms must observe the strictest quality requirements in their processes and products if they wish to participate in manufacturing programs. In the aeronautical industry, learning involved in the manufacturing process or the 'learning curve', could dramatically increase production in industry. Moreover, investment in productive processes generates technological gains that spill over into the general economic and social fabric.
The final product is defined by the level of incorporated technology in its components. This means that the relationship among the various firms participating in the final product is of great importance. Therefore, one cannot strictly refer to the technological level of the OEM, but rather of all the firms participating in the project. Although original design and instructions as to requirements and quality depend on the OEM's specifications, the technical contribution of suppliers is increasingly crucial. Beyond the basic concept and blueprints, most development engineering for the major components of a plane emerges from the joint effort of engineers from both the OEM and the main suppliers, as seen in the Madrid cluster. When these suppliers compete with others to win a contract, a sort of solutions game comes into play whereby the OEM looks for the best technological solutions, while potential suppliers attempt not to give over all their knowledge for fear of revealing industrial secrets to their competitors. 'Inducing solutions' becomes a game of zero-sum for suppliers in the short term, but a positive sum for the OEM and for clients in general once the product is developed and marketed.
In the aeronautical sector the technological requirement is closely linked to quality and reliability tests of materials and parts. Quality control of aircraft parts and components has always been the most demanding in the industrial world. Therefore, innovation in the sector is not only determined by the product itself, but also the product's reliability, strength and resistance. We have, then, the origin of embedded knowledge in a product called 'civil aircraft': an engineered design with incremental innovation and the most advanced level of pure and embedded knowledge possible. Once the plane is conceived and tested, it can be built and replicated, but exhaustive quality control is required for each and every part, from the most sophisticated motor down to the most basic screw.
Is the new organisation of production causing dependence of cluster firms? The manufacturing process makes use of resources existing both inside and outside the OEM. External resources will depend on the firms operating directly within the sector or those providing complementary products or services for the manufacture of aircraft. If firms belong to the aeronautical sector and do not produce for other markets, their dependence on firms like Airbus or Boeing will be greater since the alternatives are fewer. This dependence and vulnerability is highly restrictive for auxiliary firms in the aeronautical sector that have, in fact, only one client and often depend on the OEM for technology and indispensable quality certifications. If, on the other hand, a firm also operates in a sector that is not aeronautical but whose products are complementary to the sector, its feasibility is greater since it depends less on the OEM and has greater independence as to knowledge and technology.
In this last case, there will still be some functional dependence conditioned by the subcontracting firm's position in the supply chain for the final product, but there will probably be little technological dependence since the level of knowledge of these firms is likely to be at the technological frontier in their specialisation. They are leaders in their specialty and participate in the production of some Airbus models as suppliers of integrated systems and basic aircraft units such as cabin pressurising, motors, auxiliary motors and avionics.
The OEM is definitely enriched by knowledge emanating from its own highly qualified human resources as well as from tacit knowledge accumulated throughout the trajectory of its managers and employees, all of which place the firm at the global technological frontier in the sector. One must take into account external knowledge, which is also cutting-edge, contributed by a relatively small number of multinational firms operating in the global market who are usually not the final assemblers of the aircraft. These complementary firms -'tractor firms' or large systems manufacturershave special relations with the OEM ranging from the predisposition to assume risks in the production of their products to the knowledge strategies they display for the OEM. In addition to the horizontal knowledge flows described above, Airbus projects flows of vertical knowledge toward firms located at inferior technological levels. There are varying degrees of knowledge in which firms with relatively advanced knowledge levels, such as large systems manufacturers capable of outsourcing part of their production, can be distinguished from those firms with lower technological and entrepreneurial capability whose possibilities of acting independently of the OEM or systems manufacturers are limited. These small firms, often family-owned, are the most numerous and the most vulnerable in the system, as they usually work strictly from blueprints.
Recently, however, some of them have evolved from being mere recipients of blueprints to participating in the design of parts required by the contracting firms. It is a qualitative change and marks a quality path to be imitated by the rest of the SMEs in the sector.
